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Abstract
Today’s mobile platforms provide only coarse-grained permissions to users with regard to how third-party
applications use sensitive private data. Unfortunately, it is easy to disguise malware within the boundaries
of legitimately-granted permissions. For instance, granting access to “contacts” and “internet” may be
necessary for a text-messaging application to function, even though the user does not want contacts trans-
mitted over the internet. To understand ﬁne-grained application use of permissions, we need to statically
analyze their behavior. Even then, malware detection faces three hurdles: (1) analyses may be prohibitively
expensive, (2) automated analyses can only ﬁnd behaviors that they are designed to ﬁnd, and (3) the mali-
ciousness of any given behavior is application-dependent and subject to human judgment. To remedy these
issues, we propose semantic-based program analysis, with a human in the loop as an alternative approach to
malware detection. In particular, our analysis allows analyst-crafted semantic predicates to search and ﬁlter
analysis results. Human-oriented semantic-based program analysis can systematically, quickly and concisely
characterize the behaviors of mobile applications. We describe a tool that provides analysts with a library of
the semantic predicates and the ability to dynamically trade speed and precision. It also provides analysts
the ability to statically inspect details of every suspicious state of (abstract) execution in order to make a
ruling as to whether or not the behavior is truly malicious with respect to the intent of the application. In
addition, permission and proﬁling reports are generated to aid analysts in identifying common malicious
behaviors.
Keywords: static analysis, human analysis, malware detection
1 Introduction
Google’s Android is the most popular mobile platform, with a share of 52.5% of
all smartphones [10]. Due to Android’s open application development community,
1 Supported by the DARPA Automated Program Analysis for Cybersecurity Program.
2 An extended report is available: http://matt.might.net/a/2013/05/25/anadroid/
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more than 400,000 apps are available with 10 billion cumulative downloads by the
end of 2011 [9].
While most of those third-party applications have legitimate reasons to access
private data, the grantable permissions are too coarse: malware can hide in the
cracks. For instance, an app that should only be able to read information from a
speciﬁc site and have access to GPS information must necessarily be granted full
read/write access to the entire internet, thereby allowing a possible location leak
over the net. Or, a note-taking application can wipe out SD card ﬁles when a hidden
trigger condition is met. Meanwhile, a task manager that requests every possible
permission can be legitimately benign.
To understand ﬁne-grained use of security-critical resources, we need to statically
analyze the application with respect to what data is accessed, where the sensitive
data ﬂows, and what operations have been performed on the data (i.e., determine
whether the data is tampered with). Even then, automated malware detection faces
three hurdles: (1) analyses may be prohibitively expensive, (2) automated analyses
can only ﬁnd behaviors that they are designed to ﬁnd, and (3) the maliciousness of
any given behavior is application-dependent and subject to human judgment.
In this work, we propose semantics-based program analysis with a human in
the loop as an alternative approach to malware detection. Speciﬁcally, we derive
an analytic engine, an abstract CESK* machine based on the design methodology
of Abstracting Abstract Machines (AAM) [20] to analyze object-oriented bytecode.
Then we extend the foundational analysis to analyze speciﬁc features: multiple
entry points of Android apps and reﬂection APIs. Finally, we describe a tool that
provides analysts with a library of semantic predicates that can be used to search
and ﬁlter analysis results, and the ability to dynamically trade speed and precision.
The tool also provides analysts the ability to statically inspect details of every
suspicious state of (abstract) execution in order to make a ruling as to whether or
not the behavior is truly malicious with respect to the intent of the application.
Human-oriented, semantics-based program analysis can systematically characterize
the behaviors of mobile applications.
Overview
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the syntax
of an object-oriented byte code, and illustrates a ﬁnite-state-space-based abstract
interpretation of the byte code. Section 3 discusses analysis techniques to ana-
lyze Android-speciﬁc issues: multiple entry points and reﬂection APIs. Section 4
presents the tool implementation with user-supplied predicates. Section 5 discusses
related work, and Section 6 concludes.
2 Semantic-based program analysis
Android apps are written in Java, and compiled into Dalvik virtual machine byte
code (essentially a register-based version of Java byte code). In this section, we
present how to derive an analysis for a core object-oriented (OO) byte code language
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program ::= class-def . . .
class-def ∈ ClassDef ::= (attribute . . . class class-name extends class-name
(ﬁeld-def . . . ) (method -def . . . ))
ﬁeld-def ::= (ﬁeld attribute . . . ﬁeld-name type)
method -def ∈ MethodDef ::= (method attribute . . . method -name (type . . . ) type
(throws class-name . . . ) (limit n) s . . .)
s ∈ Stmt ::= (label label) | (nop) | (line int) | (goto label)
| (if æ (goto label)) | (assign name [æ | ce]) | (return æ)
| (ﬁeld-put æo ﬁeld-name æv) | (ﬁeld-get name æo ﬁeld-name)
æ ∈ AExp ::= this | true | false | null | void | name | int
| (atomic-op æ . . .æ) | instance-of(æ, class-name)
ce ::= (new class-name)
| (invoke-kind method -name (æ . . .æ) (type0 . . . typen))
invoke-kind ::= invoke-static | invoke-direct | invoke-virtual
| invoke-interafce | invoke-super
type ::= class-name | int | byte | char | boolean
attribute ::= public | private | protected | ﬁnal | abstract.
Fig. 1. An object-oriented bytecode adapted from the Android speciﬁcation [18].
based on Dalvik. After presenting this foundational analysis, we shall illustrate
Android-speciﬁc analysis techniques in subsequent sections.
The ﬁrst step is to deﬁne a syntax. Figure 1 presents the syntax of an OO byte
code language that is closely modeled on the Dalvik virtual machine. Statements
encode individual actions; atomic expressions encode atomically computable values;
and complex expressions encode expressions with possible non-termination or side
eﬀects. There are four kinds of names: Reg for registers, ClassName for class names,
FieldName for ﬁeld names and MethodName for method names. The special register
name ret holds the return value of the last function called. With respect to a given
program, we assume a syntactic meta function S : Label → Stmt∗, which maps a
label to the sequence of statements that start with that label.
Ordinarily, the next step toward an analyzer would be to derive a concrete
machine to interpret the language just deﬁned. The meaning of a program will be
deﬁned as the set of machine states reachable from an initial state. The purpose of
static analysis is to derive a computable approximation of the concrete machine’s
behavior—of these states. We’ll construct an abstract semantics to do that. Since
the concrete and the abstract semantics are so close in structure, we will present
only the abstract semantics of the byte code, while highlighting places that are
diﬀerent from its concrete counterpart to save space.
2.1 Abstract semantics
We deﬁne our abstract interpretation as a direct, structural abstraction of a ma-
chine model for the OO bytecode [20]. Because the structural abstraction creates
an abstract machine nearly identical to the machine model itself (with exceptions
that we explain), we don’t provide the concrete machine model. The analysis of a
program is deﬁned as the set of abstract machine states reachable by an abstract
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cˆ ∈̂State = Stmt∗ × ̂FramePointer ×̂Store × ̂KontAddr [states]
σˆ ∈̂Store =̂Addr ⇀ V̂al [stores]
aˆ ∈̂Addr = ̂RegAddr + ̂FieldAddr + ̂KontAddr [addresses]
âκ ∈ ̂KontAddr is a ﬁnite set of continuation addresses
r̂a ∈ ̂RegAddr = ̂FramePointer × Reg
f̂a ∈ ̂FieldAddr = ̂ObjectPointer × FieldName
κˆ ∈̂Kont = fun(fˆp, s, âκ) + halt [continuations]
dˆ ∈ V̂al = P
(
̂ObjectValue +̂String + Ẑ +̂Kont
)
[abstract values]
oˆv ∈ ̂ObjectValue = ̂ObjectPointer × ClassName
fˆp ∈ ̂FramePointer is a ﬁnite set of frame pointers [frame pointers]
ôp ∈ ̂ObjectPointer is a ﬁnite set of object pointers [object pointers].
Fig. 2. The abstract state-space.
transition relation ()—the core of the abstract semantics. That is, abstract eval-
uation is deﬁned by the set of states reached by the reﬂexive, transitive closure of
the () relation.
Figure 2 details the abstract state-space. We assume the natural element-wise,
point-wise and member-wise lifting of a partial order () across this state-space.
States of this machine consist of a tuples of of statements, frame pointers, heaps,
and stack pointers. To synthesize the abstract state-space, we force frame pointers
and object pointers (and thus addresses) to be a ﬁnite set. When we compact the
set of addresses into a ﬁnite set during a structural abstraction, the machine may
(and likely will) run out of addresses to allocate, and when it does, the pigeon-hole
principle will force multiple abstract values to reside at the same (now abstract)
address. As a result, we have no choice but to force the range of the ̂Store to
become a power set in the abstract state-space: now each abstract address can hold
multiple values.
2.1.1 Abstract transition relation
In this section, we provide major cases for the abstract transition relation. The
abstract transition relation delegates to helper functions for injecting programs into
states, and for evaluating atomic expressions and looking up ﬁeld values:
• Iˆ : Stmt∗ →̂State injects an sequence of instructions into an initial state: cˆ0 =
Iˆ(s) = (s, fˆp0, [âκ0 → halt], âκ0)
• Aˆ : AExp× ̂FramePointer×̂Store ⇀ V̂al evaluates atomic expressions (speciﬁcally
for variable look-up): Aˆ(name , fˆp, σˆ) = σ(fˆp,name)
• AˆF : AExp× ̂FramePointer ×̂Store × FieldName ⇀ V̂al looks up ﬁelds:
AˆF(æo, fˆp, σˆ,ﬁeld -name) =
⊔
σˆ(ôp,ﬁeld -name) , where
(ôp, class-name) ∈ Aˆ(æo, fˆp, σˆ).
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The rules for the abstract transition relation () ⊆ ̂State ×̂State describe
how components of state evolve in light of each kind of statement. In subsequent
paragraphs, we will illustrate the important rules that involve objects and function
calls, omitting less important ones to save space:
• New object creation Creating a new object allocates a potentially non-fresh ad-
dress and joins the newly initialized object to other values residing at this store
address.
cˆ︷ ︸︸ ︷
([[(assign name (new class-name)) : s]], fˆp, σˆ, âκ) ⇒ (s, fˆp, σˆ
′′, âκ),where
ôp
′
= ̂allocOP(cˆ), σˆ′ = σˆ unionsq [(fˆp,name) → (ôp
′
, class-name)],
σˆ′′ = ̂initObject(σˆ′, class-name),
where the helper ̂initObject :̂Store × ClassName ⇀̂Store initializes ﬁelds.
• Instance ﬁeld reference/update Referencing a ﬁeld uses AˆF to lookup the ﬁeld val-
ues and joins these values with the values at the store location for the destination
register:
([[(ﬁeld-get name æo ﬁeld -name) : s]], fˆp, σˆ, âκ) (s, fˆp, σˆ
′, âκ), where
σˆ′ = σˆ unionsq [(fˆp,name) → AˆF(æo, fˆp, σˆ,ﬁeld -name)].
Updating a ﬁeld ﬁrst determines the abstract object values from the store,
extracts the object pointer from all the possible values, then pairs the object
pointers with the ﬁeld name to get the ﬁeld address, and ﬁnally joins the new
values to those found at this store location:
([[(ﬁeld-put æo ﬁeld -name æv) : s]], fˆp, σˆ, âκ) (s, fˆp, σˆ
′, âκ), where
σˆ′ = σˆ unionsq [(ôp,ﬁeld -name) → Aˆ(æv, fˆp, σˆ)], (ôp, class-name) ∈ Aˆ(æo, fˆp, σˆ).
• Method invocation This rule involves all four components of the machine. The
abstract interpretation of non-static method invocation can result in the method
being invoked on a set of possible objects, rather than a single object as in
the concrete evaluation. Since multiple objects are involved, this can result in
diﬀerent method deﬁnitions being resolved for the diﬀerent objects. The method
is resolved 3 and then applied as follows:
cˆ︷ ︸︸ ︷
([[(invoke-kind method -name (æ0 . . .æn) (type0 . . . typen))]] : s, fˆp, σˆ, âκ)

̂applyMethod (m,æ, fˆp, σˆ, âκ)
where the function ̂applyMethod takes a method deﬁnition, arguments, a frame
3 Since the language supports inheritance, method resolution requires a traversal of the class hierarchy.
This traversal follows the expected method and is omitted here so we can focus on the abstract rules.
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pointer, a store, and a new stack pointer and produces the next states:
̂applyMethod (m,æ, fˆp, σˆ, âκ) = (s, fˆp
′
, σˆ′′, âκ
′
),where
fˆp
′
= ̂allocFP(cˆ), âκ
′
=̂allocK (cˆ),
σˆ′ = σˆ unionsq [âκ
′
→ {fun(fˆp, s, âκ)}], σˆ
′′ = σˆ′ unionsq [(fˆp
′
,name i) → Aˆ(æi, fˆp, σˆ)].
• Procedure return Procedure return restores the caller’s context and extends the
return value in the dedicated return register, ret.
([[(return æ) : s]], fˆp, σˆ, âκ) (s
′, fˆp
′
, σˆ′, âκ
′
), where
fun(fp ′, s′, a′
κ
) ∈ σ(aκ) and σˆ
′ = σˆ unionsq [(fˆp
′
, ret) → Aˆ(æ, fˆp, σˆ)].
3 Analysis of reﬂection and multiple entry points in
abstract CESK* machine
While the crux of the analysis for Android apps has been presented in the previous
section, our abstract CESK* machine has to be extended to analyze multiple entry
points in Android apps and some intricate APIs like reﬂection.
3.1 Fixed-point computation for multiple entry points
A typical static analysis only deals with one entry point of traditional programs (the
main method). However, any Android application has more than one entry point,
due to the event-driven nature of the Android platform. Intuitively, to explore the
reachable states for all the entry points seems to require the exploration for all
the permutation of entry points. But this can easily lead to state-space explosion.
Related works like [13] prune paths for speciﬁc Android apps (but not soundly).
We solve the problem in a sound but inexpensive way. Speciﬁcally, we iterate
over all entry points that have been found. For each entry point, we compute
its reachable states via the abstract CESK* machine. Then we compute a single
widened store from those states using the widening techniques similar to the ones
presented in [15]. The store then forms part of next state to continue the next entry
point ﬁxed-point computation. Obviously, the store is monotonic, which ensures a
sound approximation of the eﬀects introduced from all entry points. This diminishes
precision slightly, but the gains in speed are considerable. The eﬀects of similar
technique are also noted in [15][19].
3.2 Reﬂection
This section presents how to extend the abstract CESK* machine to analyze one of
the most commonly used dynamic features in Android—reﬂection.
Reﬂection enables programs to access class information to create objects and
invoke methods at runtime. Type information involved is dynamically retrieved
from strings. The strings can come from user input, ﬁles, network or hard-coded,
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literal strings. Literal strings are not infrequent in reﬂection. The following code
snippet demonstrates a common case of reﬂection in Java:
1 Class<?> aeco = Class.forName("android.os.Environment");
2 Method externalDir = aeco.getMethod("getExternalStorageDirectory", (Class[])null);
3 (File)externalDir.invoke(null);
A class object is created in Ln.1 and the method object for getExternalStorageDi-
rectory 4 is created in Ln.2. Finally, the method is invoked in Ln.3 via the method
object externalDir. Since it is a static method with no arguments, the receiver ob-
ject being invoked is null. Otherwise, the argument aeco.newInstance() needs to be
supplied in Ln.3.
To analyze such reﬂection, we can integrate string analysis into abstract in-
terpretation of Java API calls. In the abstract CESK*, we need ﬁve additional
transition rules, mainly for simple string analysis and the APIs involving creation
of class object, method object, class instantiation and method invocation:
• String: Strings are objects in Java, and so string instantiation is a special case
for the new rule (see Section 2.1) 5 :
cˆ︷ ︸︸ ︷
([[(const-string name str ) : s]], fˆp, σˆ, âκ) (s, fˆp, σˆ
′′, âκ),where ôp = ̂allocOP(cˆ).
σˆ′ = σˆ unionsq [(fˆp,name) → {(ôp, java/lang/String)}], σˆ′′ = σˆ′ unionsq [(ôp, value) →
α(str )], Unlike the usual case for new rule, there is a ﬁeld value paired with
the string object pointer as ﬁeld oﬀset to store abstract string values. α is the
abstraction function for string values. The simplest form is to construct a ﬂat lat-
tice for strings. Other string analysis such as Costantini et al. [4], Christensen et
al. [3], etc. can be directly incorporated.
• Class objects: In byte code, the creation of a class object using Class.forName is an
invoke-static statement, with the ﬁrst argument referencing to string values. The
rule will allocate a new class object on the heap, with the ﬁeld oﬀset class-name
points to the string reference looked up by the address (fˆp,æ). In addition, the
class object reference is stored into the ret address:
cˆ︷ ︸︸ ︷
([[(invoke-static java/lang/Class/forName æ java/lang/String) : s]], fˆp, σˆ, âκ)
 (s, fˆp, σˆ′′, âκ),where ôpCls = ̂allocOP(cˆ),
σˆ′ = σˆ unionsq [(ôpCls, class-name) → σˆ(fˆp,æ)],
σˆ′′ = σˆ′ unionsq [(fˆp, ret) → (ôpCls, java/lang/Class)]
• Method objects: Method objects are represented as method headers, including
function name, arguments and their types, return values and exceptions that the
method can throw. 6 A method object is resolved from a class object, whose class
name can be obtained from the ﬁrst argument æ0. The second argument will be
resolved as the method name. Arrays of argument types of the method object
4 Since the method is a static method, so no instantiated object is needed, which is null.
5 java/lang/StringBuilder is interpreted in similar way.
6 Exceptions handling is omitted in the semantics.
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are stored in the third register æ3.
7
cˆ︷ ︸︸ ︷
([[(invoke-virtual java/lang/Class/getMethod (æ0 æ1 æ2) typesargs) : s]], fˆp, σˆ, âκ)
 newMethodObject(ôpMethod,m, s, fˆp, σˆ
′, âκ), where
(ôpCls, java/lang/Class) ∈ σˆ(fˆp,æ0), (ôp0, java/lang/String) ∈ σˆ(ôpCls, class-name),
class-name ∈ σˆ(ôp
0
, value), (ôp
1
, java/lang/String) ∈ σˆ(fˆp,æ1)
method -name ∈ σˆ(ôp
1
, value), ôpMethod = ̂allocOP(cˆ)
σˆ′ = σˆ unionsq [(fˆp, ret) → (ôpMethod, java/lang/Reﬂect/Method)].
Similarly like the transition rule for function call, the method resolution process
is omitted here. The resolution process needs the information class-name and
method-name. Also note that the resolution result is a set of public methods
m, rather than one. The helper function newMethodObject takes the newly
allocated method object pointer, the set of method deﬁnitions in the domain
MethodDef, the rest statements, the frame pointer, store, and the stack pointer
and returns the successor states. Again, the method object value will be stored
into the ret address.
• Class instantiation: The API call java/lang/Class/newInstance is used to instan-
tiate a new object of a concrete class type (not an abstract class nor interface).
The class type name can be resolved from the ﬁrst argument æ of the instruc-
tion. Unlike the normal new statement, the class instantiation requires the in-
vocation of default class constructor. Therefore, we ﬁrst resolve class deﬁni-
tions by using a helper function C : P (ClassName) → P (ClassDef), and then use
getDefaultConstructor : ClassDef → MethodDef to get the a constructor method.
After that, the control is transferred to the constructor invocation via invoke-direct
statement, which is inserted in front of the rest states s.
cˆ︷ ︸︸ ︷
([[(invoke-virtual java/lang/Class/newInstance æ java/lang/Class) : s]], fˆp, σˆ, âκ)
 (s′ : s, fˆp, σˆ′′, âκ),where
(ôpCls, java/lang/Class) ∈ σˆ(fˆp,æ), (ôp, java/lang/String) ∈ σˆ(ôpCls, class-name),
class-def ∈ C(σˆ(ôp, value)), ôpCls = ̂allocOP(cˆ),
m = getDefaultConstructor(class-def ),
s′ = (invoke-direct, m.method -name (æ0 . . .æn) (type0 . . . typen)),
σˆ′ = σˆ unionsq [(fˆp,æ0) → (ôpCls, java/lang/Class)],
σˆ′′ = σˆ′ unionsq [(fˆp, ret) → (ôpCls, java/lang/Class)].
• Method invocation: Reﬂection method invocation in byte code is achieved by
invoking the API java/lang/reﬂect/Method/invoke via invoke-virtual on a method
object, which can be obtained from the ﬁrst argument. The second argument is
7 We don’t interpret the arrays of the types explicitly.
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the receiver object that the method will be invoked on. 8 The third argument is
an array of arguments.
cˆ︷ ︸︸ ︷
([[(invoke-virtual java/lang/reﬂect/Method/invoke (æ0 æ1 æ2) typesargs) : s]], fˆp, σˆ, âκ)

̂applyMethod (m,æ, fˆp, σˆ, âκ).
Like the general rule for function call, we have to resolve the method m, and
then by using ̂applyMethod we can get successor states.
4 The tool with user-supplied predicates
In this section, we ﬁrst brieﬂy presents the implemented analyzer, since the core of
the analysis has been speciﬁed in Section 2 an 3. Then we illustrate the tool usage,
particularly with respect to user-supplied predicates.
The analysis engine is a faithful rendering of the formal speciﬁcation in Section 2
and 3. In addition, it incorporates previous techniques that boost precision and
performance, including the abstract garbage collection [17], store-widening [16],
and simple abstract domains to analyze strings [4]. Other constructs of the tool
are:
• Entry points ﬁnder: This component discovers all the entry points of an
Android application. Then the engine will explore reachable states based on the
algorithm presented in Section 3.
• Permission violation report: It reports whether an application asks for more
permissions than it actually uses or vice versa.
• State graph: This presents all reachable states with states-of-interest high-
lighted according to default predicates or those supplied by analysts.
• API dumps: This presents all the reachable API calls.
• Heat map: This reports analyzer intensity on per-statement basis.
The work ﬂow of our human-in-the-loop analyzer—AnaDroid—is as follows:
(1) an analyst conﬁgures analysis options and malware predicates; (2) AnaDroid
presents a permission-usage report, an API call dump, a state graph and a heat
map. The major parameters of the analyzer include call-site context-sensitivity—k,
widening, abstract garbage collection, cutoﬀs, and predicates. An analyst can make
the trade-oﬀ between runtime and precision of the analyzer with these parameters.
In addition, the predicates enable analysts to inspect states of interests to detect
malware.
4.1 Semantic predicates
To assist analysts, we provide a library of predicates for common patterns. The
two major kinds of predicates in AnaDroid are: “State color predicate” renders
matching states in a customized color; “State truncate predicate” optimizes the
8 It will be null if the method to be invoked is a static method. Its transition rule can be easily adapted
from the rule presented.
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analysis exploration by allowing analysts to manually prune paths beginning at
matching states.
Examples of usage of the predicates are listed as follows:
uses-API?: It is used to specify what color to render the state that uses the
speciﬁed API call. The color is a string representing a SVG color scheme [11],
i.e.“red, colorscheme=set312”:
(lambda (state)
(if (uses-API? state "org/apache/http/client/HttpClient/execute" st-attr)
"red,colorscheme=set312"
#f))
Note that st-attr is a specialized keyword used by our analyzer. state is the
parameter of the predicate.
uses-name?: It is a variant of uses-API?, used to identify a state with the
speciﬁc method name in code:
(lambda (state)
(if (uses-name? state "org/ucomb/android/testinterface/RectanglePlus/getArea")
"red,colorscheme=set312"
#f))
An analyst can also use cond to specify multiple colors:
(lambda (state)
(cond
[(uses-API? state "org/apache/http/client/HttpClient/execute" st-attr )
"red,colorscheme=set312"]
[(uses-name? state "org/ucomb/android/testinterface /RectanglePlus/getArea")
"8,colorscheme=set312"]
[else #f]))
truncate?:
(lambda (state)
(if (truncate? state "org/apache/http/client/HttpClient/execute")
"12,colorscheme=set312"
#f))
5 Related work
Stowaway [7] is a static analysis tool identifying whether an application requests
more permissions than it actually uses. PScout [1] aims for a similar goal, but pro-
duces more precise and ﬁne-grained mapping from APIs to permissions. Our least
permission report uses the Stowaway permission map as AnaDroid’s database. 9
Jeon et al. [12] proposes enforcing a ﬁne-grained permission system. It limits
access to resources that could be accessed by Android’s default permissions. Specif-
ically, the security policy uses a white list to determine which resources an app can
9 Our new version analyzer is upgraded to PScout data set.
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use and a black list to deny access to resources. In addition, strings potentially
containing URLs are identiﬁed by pattern matching and constant propagation is
used to infer more speciﬁc Internet permissions.
Dynamic taint analysis has been applied to identify security vulnerabilities at
run time in Android apps. TaintDroid [6] dynamically tracks the ﬂow of sensitive
information and looks for conﬁdentiality violations. QUIRE [5], IPCInspection [8],
and XManDroid [2] are designed to prevent privilege escalation, where an appli-
cation is compromised to provide sensitive capabilities to other applications. The
vulnerabilities introduced by interapp communication is considered future work.
However, these approaches typically ignore implicit ﬂows raised by control struc-
tures in order to reduce run-time overhead.
The other approach to enforce security on mobile devices is delegating the control
to users. iOS and Window User Account Control [14] can prompt a dialog to request
permissions from users when applications try to access resources or make security
or privacy-related system level changes. However, we advocate stopping potential
malware from ﬂoating in the market beforehand via strict inspections. Our tool has
designed with analysts in mind and can help them identify malicious behaviors of
submitted applications.
6 Conclusion
In this work, we propose a human-oriented semantic-based program analysis for
Android apps. We derive an abstract CESK* machine to analyze object-oriented
bytecode. Then the foundational analysis is extended to analyze speciﬁc features:
multiple entry points of Android apps and reﬂection APIs. We also describe a tool
that provides analysts with a library of semantic predicates that can be used to
search and ﬁlter analysis results, and the ability to dynamically trade speed and
precision. It also provides analysts the ability to statically inspect details of every
suspicious state of (abstract) execution in order to make a ruling as to whether or
not the behavior is truly malicious with respect to the intent of the application. In
addition, permission and proﬁling reports are generated to aid analysts in identi-
fying common malicious behaviors. The technique can systematically, quickly and
concisely characterize the behaviors of mobile applications, as demonstrated by case
studies in the extended report.
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